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Abstract 
Ghana’s democracy is plagued by zero-sum politics usually described as winner-takes-all. Winner-takes-all is 
political behaviour involving post-election distribution and redistribution of public resources to reward political 
loyalists, with or without considerations for competence and merit. A key mechanism for this is the appointment 
of such loyalists to public offices that control key national resources. Although winner-takes-all is seen as a 
cancer cell in the country’s democracy and politics and has often been condemned by the citizenry and civil 
society organizations alike, it has become behaviour of choice for all political parties once they win the mandate 
to govern. This study analyses the institutional basis of contemporary democratic politics in Ghana, focusing on 
the rules, and argues that winner-takes-all is a rational response by political actors to the incentives and 
opportunities offered by specific formal and informal rules of the country’s democracy. The argument is shaped 
by a careful analysis of specific legal provisions that incentivize political actors to act in that manner. The study 
makes two important contributions to our understanding of contemporary Ghanaians politics. First it provides an 
alternative perspective that suggests that winner-takes-all is an effect and not a cause of the country’s 
governance challenges, and second it draws attention to the centrality of rules and their design in shaping 
political behaviour.  
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Introduction  
Since 1993 when Ghana returned to constitutional democracy, the country has witnessed three successful 
transfers of power from one political party to another. Specifically, power was transfer from the National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic Party (NPP) in 2001, then back to the NDC in 2009 and again 
to the NPP in 2017. While  smooth transfer of power is a remarkable departure from the periods of political 
instability that defined the first three and half decades of the country’s political development, the recent periods 
of democratic transfers of power have  been characterized by the “politics of winner-takes-all” (Lindberg, 2003; 
Ijon, 2018; Abotsi, 2013; Kumah-Abiwu, 2017; Gyampo, 2015; Lamptey & Salihu, 2012). This has reduced 
changes in government through competitive elections to the sharing of spoils usually associated with conquest in 
a war situation. President Jerry John Rawlings of the NDC, whose tenure established the 1992 constitution, was 
accused of appointing only NDC loyalists and persons from ethnic groups that supported his military regime and 
later political party to public offices (Gyimah-Boadi, 2003). In 2001, after President John Agyekum Kufour took 
office, he immediately proceeded to remove many actual or perceived loyalists of the NDC from public offices 
and replaced them with NPP loyalists. Although he was accused of not doing  enough to exorcise his 
administration of appointees he inherited at his electoral victory in 2008 (Nkansah, 2012), appointments to 
various public offices made under Professor John Evans Atta Mills were largely shaped by affiliation, 
membership and sympathies to the NDC (Modernghana, 2009). President John Dramani Mahama who inherited 
the unexpired term of President Atta Mills maintained the appointments bequeathed to him, but signaled his 
desire to end the practice; and a preference for a more inclusive and merit-based distribution of appointments to 
political office (Mahama, 2012)). Thus, when he secured presidential victory in 2012, John Mahama made 
several high-profile appointments of persons who had no known partisan affiliation to the NDC at the time. This 
notwithstanding, he was also criticized not only by the NPP for what was described as appointment of family and 
friends, but also by the NDC for appointing persons with whom the party had no records of membership and 
affiliation. Following his electoral victory in the 2016 general elections, President Nana Akufo Addo appointed 
not only party loyalists of the NPP, but also many of his known friends and family to public offices (Graphic, 
2019). 
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This practice of sharing public offices and associated resources by successive presidents has received public 
condemnation from civil society organizations and citizens alike. For the most part, the public outcry stems from 
the manner in which public offices and state resources are captured and appropriated mostly by members of a 
victorious party after competitive elections. Thus, apprehension and concerns about winner-takes-all politics in 
Ghana have focused almost entirely on the dangers associated with the practice without regard for the root 
causes of the phenomenon; the rules of law and the ensuing institutional design that permit its persistence. For 
instance, there are media reports that three of the country’s leading civil society organisations, the Institute of 
Democratic Governance (IDEG), the Institute of Economic Affairs, (IEA), and the Centre for Democracy and 
Development (CDD) converge on the view that the emergence of a two party system in Ghana has created a 
culture of sharing spoils and embeds politics of exclusion, marginalization, polarization, fear and panic, 
persistent threat of election violence, ensuring that  a danger of instability persistently hangs over the country. 
They add that the practice tends to undermine socio-economic transformation of the country due to its 
acrimonious nature and the resulting animosity and hatred it fosters among political opponents (Ghanaweb, 2017; 
Ghana News Agency, 2014; Ghanaweb, 2018).  
Ijon (2018) argues that the practice of winner takes all has its origins in the colonial administration which 
claimed everything in the then Gold Coast for the British crown, thereby not only depriving the indigenous 
population of everything, but also reducing them to slaves to be exploited. Consequently, the practice entered 
into postcolonial politics and shaped the relationship between the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) and the 
United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) major political parties of the early postcolonial era. In reference to the 
situation since 1992, Justice Emile Short (2015) a former Commissioner for Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ) in Ghana argues that the President’s overriding powers in the appointment of heads of public 
institutions deepens the winner-takes-all phenomenon (Ghanaweb, 2017). Charles Gabriel Palmer-Buckle (2015), 
a leading cleric, warns that Ghana risks political stagnation if the winner-takes-all system is not effectively 
tackled (News Ghana, 2015). Expressing worry about the situation, one of Ghana’s most astute and prominent 
statesmen, K.B. Asante (2016) in a feature article published in the national dailies averred that “it is wrong to 
give all official posts to party members whether competent or not. What I am strongly against is the term used to 
describe the system, namely winner-takes-all. A party wins an election alright, but the win is not like that of a 
lottery where chance selects the winner who takes all the money. We should completely reject any semblance of 
an election to a lotto. Political elections are serious undertakings of responsibility”  
A few years earlier, a systematic, analytical, field-based and deep study of the operation of Ghana’s 1992 
Constitution (Kpessa & Atuguba, 2013) found that “Ghanaians…prefer an inclusive government, as opposed to a 
winner-takes-all attitude”. Views collected by the Constitution Review Commission across the country were to 
the effect that “there is the need to review the ‘winner takes all’ system in the nation’s politics which hardly 
considers members of opposition parties as partners in development” because it “gives rise to corruption, bribery 
and violence in the country because political parties would want to use all means possible to win elections”. 
These views are contained in a section of the report which summed up some radical views of a section of 
Ghanaians on winner-takes-all as follows:  
“The introduction of partisan politics at the district level would ensure that political parties that lose 
national elections can still maintain control of some districts and stay relevant to the business of 
governing the nation, and extract benefits for their followers. This partisan presence can ultimately 
ameliorate, in a sobering way, the polarisation caused by the monopoly of a ruling party over both the 
central and local government structures in a ‘winner-takes-all’ system.”  (Commission Constitution 
Review, 2011, p. 741). 
Indeed, in his first major policy statement upon assumption of office as interim President in July 2012, 
barely six months after this report was submitted, John Mahama expressed concerns about the pervasiveness of 
the politics of winner takes all in the country and pledged to ensure it is tackled (Mahama, 2012). 
How do we explain the prevalence of winner-takes-all in Ghana irrespective of which political party 
governs?  This paper seeks to answer this question through a discussion of the zero-sum politics of winner-takes-
all associated with contemporary Ghanaian democracy and argues that although the practice is an affront to the 
objectives of inclusivity and nation building, it nevertheless deprives its logic from specific rules of the country’s 
democratic politics. Thus, contrary to perceptions that winner-takes-all is the cause of Ghana’s governance 
challenges, the paper suggest that it is rather the effect of rules that define the character of the country’s 
democracy. Winner takes-all should therefore be seen as a realistic and rational response to the incentives and 
opportunities offered by specific formal and informal rules of the country’s democratic system. This framing of 
the argument is not intended in any way to defend or justify the practice; rather, it presents alternative 
perspectives that allow for policy makers and the citizenry alike to identify rules that provide incentives to 
embolden the practice and engender appropriate reforms. This argument is interesting because it departs from the 
existing explanations that seek to portray winner-takes-all as deviant political behaviour and second, it draws 
attention to the importance of rules in shaping the political behaviour of actors.  
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The rest of the paper is divided into three sections. While the first section discusses the conceptual home of 
the politics of winner-takes-all, situating it within the broader notion of neo-patrimonial politics, the second 
section identifies and explains the role of specific rules governing Ghana’s democratic politics in directly or 
indirectly incentivizing the phenomenon. The concluding section draws lessons from the analyses for improving 
our understanding of political behaviours associated with winner-takes-all politics. Methodologically, the paper 
draws on analysis of some existing legislative frameworks, observations, and the review of newspaper reports 
and secondary literature.   
 
Politics of Winner-Takes-All in Perspective  
Winner-takes-all is a form of political patronage in which  democratically elected office-holders restrict 
recruitment to public office, often carried out through the  power of appointment vested in them, mostly to 
individuals with whom the office-holders shares similar political beliefs or affiliations or to party loyalists. In 
other words, it is a political arrangement in which a political party or its candidate, after winning an election and 
taking control of the state machinery, gives most or all government jobs to its supporters, friends and relatives as 
a reward for their support and contributions for the victory, and as an enticement for them to continue working 
for the party and candidate for the purposes of future elections. Often, such appointments are preceded by a mass 
removal from office of existing staff in various positions in the public services. The practice is akin to what has 
been described as patrimonial politics in which political authority is exercised on the basis of relationships of 
personal loyalty between the individual who possesses the mandate to govern and the administrative staff 
(Weber, 1947). According to Kelsall (2011) although Weber’s analysis observed that patrimonialism takes 
various forms, in all its variants, it points to a “political system held together by personal distribution of material 
resources and perks” deliberately given out in a manner that creates the impression that resources distributed 
emanate from the personal benevolence and magnanimity of persons in position of authority. In such a political 
system, the lines between that which is public and that which is private are blurred at best, and the leader enjoys 
absolute power by engendering support through the distribution of state resources guised as private property.   
Following the logic of Weber, politics in African countries have been described in various ways, primarily 
on accounts of what is considered a misfit between political behaviour found on the continent and ideas of 
Weber. Thus, attempts to understand the nature and dynamics of the relationship between governments and the 
governed has found expression in multiplicity of terminologies. For O'Donnell, (1996) politics in Ghana and 
African countries can best be described as acts of clientelism. Bayart (1993) described the same situation as 
politics of the belly, and Chabal and Daloz (1999) described it as the instrumentalization of informal politics. 
Joseph (1987) used the term prebendalisms, and Sandbrook (1985) neo-patrimonialism. Although these and 
other scholars differed in the specific lexiconic label of the phenomenon studied, there is general convergence 
among them suggesting that African politics is characterized by a co-existence of formal and informal 
institutions of governance, with the latter often serving as the key point of reference for what is considered 
appropriate behaviour as far as the relationship between political leaders and their followers is concerned. As 
such African democracies are seen as manifesting systems in which political relationships that are broadly 
patrimonial in nature pervade and supplant legal-rational administrative arrangements (Clapham, 1985)). As a 
result, leaders occupy positions of power in the formal-legal sense but exercise that power not in the formal-legal 
sense. Rather, such power is considered personal property and thus used to secure support and loyalty from 
sections of the population.     
In a study that focused on Southeast Asia, Scott (1972) noted that countries where colonial political 
institutions are superimposed on indigenous systems of governance, the relationship between leaders and their 
followers is shaped by the norms of patron-client principles, where the leaders (patrons) by virtue of access to 
resources made available by the position of power, are able to buy the loyalty and support of others (clients) in a 
manner that suggests that resources of the position are personal properties and only enjoyed by the clients at the 
goodwill and benevolence of the patrons. In particular, the relationship is shaped by the values of reciprocity in 
which the leader offers favors and access to resources associated with the position to the clients, and in turn 
secures the loyalty and support of those clients in the performance of the duties and responsibilities associated 
with that position.  In one study, Van de Walle, (2001)  argued that “political authority in Africa is based on the 
giving and granting of favors, in an endless series of dyadic exchanges that go from the village level to the 
highest reaches of the central state” (p. 51), and politics is essentially about “providing material resources in 
exchange for personal loyalty”  (Lindberg, 2003, pp. 123-4). Chabal & Daloz (1999) attribute the prevalence of 
patron-client behaviour in African politics to the primacy of ethnicity in which the position of power is highly 
valued due to its ability to engineer access to resources for the benefit or support of one’s family and kinsmen 
and as well reinforce loyalty and solidarity.  According to Van de Welle, (2007) patron-client politics is often 
characterized by patronage, which is a phenomenon ubiquitous with mass politics, and defined as the “practice 
of using state resources to provide jobs and services for political clienteles” with the sole purpose of generating 
support for the patron, as well as, prebendalisms, which involves offering an individual a position in “public 
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office in order for him/her to gain personal access over state resources” (p 51).  
The practice of rewarding loyal support with positions in public office in democratic politics is traced to 
several early America Presidents, however it was not until Andrew Jackson, that what became known as the 
spoils system was officially made a government policy (Fish, 1905; Friedrich, 1937). Upon assumption of office 
in March 1829 as President after a bitter campaign, Andrew Jackson grew suspicious of the staff of the federal 
public service who had worked with his predecessor, and thought their continuous stay would undermine his 
administration’s programs. Angered that people in the federal service who were opposed to him consistently 
blocked some of his initiatives, Jackson came up with a plan to cleanse the service of potential political 
opponents and replace them with persons whose loyalty he could count on (Somit, 1984). Although Jackson’s 
political opponents resisted his policy of packing the public service with members of his political establishment, 
he prevailed, and according to McNamara (2020) government records of the 19th century show “that Jackson's 
policy accounted for nearly 700 government officers losing their jobs in 1829, the first year of his presidency. In 
July 1829, there was a newspaper report claiming the mass firings of federal employees actually affected the 
economy of the city of Washington, with merchants unable to sell goods”.  
Jackson and his supporters were accused of abusing power to corrupt the federal public service, but in a 
statement credited to one of Jackson’s loyalists, they defended the practice of appointing party supporters to 
public office by arguing that “They see nothing wrong in the rule that to the victors belong the spoils” 
(Hofstadter, 1970, p. 250). This policy was further defended by Jackson himself in a statement noting “in a 
country where offices are created solely for the benefit of the people no man has any more intrinsic right to 
official station than another. Offices were not established to give support to particular men at the public expense. 
No individual wrong is therefore, done by removal, since neither appointment to nor continuance in office is a 
matter of right” (Jackson, 1829). Bearfield (2009) noted that Jackson’s very rise to the presidency was shaped by 
campaigns “promising state and local politicians control over patronage appointments in exchange for their 
support” (p. 69). Jackson’s spoils politics shares striking similarity with the phenomenon of winner-takes-all in 
contemporary democratic politics. Indeed, winner-takes-all is a reflection of modern competitive politics, which 
divides societies on the basis of ideology, class, ethnicity or other forms of identity.  
 
Understanding the Role of Rules in Political Behaviour 
The study of rules in the social sciences has primarily been the preoccupation of economists, political scientists, 
and sociologist for a long time especially in works committed to institutional theory and governance. In its 
earliest form, institutional analysis in the social sciences was normative in character and committed to 
understanding how to design appropriate political institutions and systems that would serve the common good of 
society. Writing after the English Civil War, Thomas Hobbes advocated for the development of strong political 
institutions to save mankind from his worst self. John Locke on the other hand, argued for the contractual design 
of political institutions to ensure that politics and governance prioritizes things that matter most to the people in 
society. Indeed, the works of Rousseau, Montesquieu, and several other political philosophers share common 
interest in the structural design of political institutions. In this early tradition of scholarship, institutional analysis 
was confined to the study of formal aspects of the machinery of government including the making of laws, the 
operations of the executive, legislature and judiciary, among others. For the most part, institutional analysis of 
this period was heavily descriptive and normative in character.  
Following the works of March & Olsen (1984)  that drew attention to the centrality of values and norms in 
shaping human behaviour and decisions made by political actors, institutional analysis broadened its scope to 
accommodate a wide variety of issues that shape collective decisions, especially in politics. In particular, 
institutions were seen not only as “rules of the game” (North, 1990)  and the “foundation of life” but also defined 
to include “the formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and systems of meaning that 
define the context within which individuals, corporations, labor unions, nation-states and other organizations 
operate and interact with each other. They are settlements born from struggles and bargaining” (Campbell, 2004, 
p. 1).  This perspective is widely shared by several scholars in the social sciences engaged in institutional 
analysis. While Hall (1986) noted that institutions are “the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standards 
operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and 
economy” (p. 19); Krasner (1982) described institutions as consisting of principles, rules, norms, and shared 
expectations that serve as the reference point that filters the expectations of actors.  
In another work much later, Hall & Taylor  (1996) noted that institutions include not only the formal and 
informal rules, but also “routines, norms and conventions embedded” in organizational structure, and these range 
from accepted operating procedures in administrative establishments to “conventions governing trade unions 
behavior or bank-firm relations” (p. 938). North (1990) whose institutional analysis won him the Nobel Prize in 
Economics, also defined institutions as “any form of constraints that human beings devise to share interaction” 
or as regularities in competitive interactions…customs, and rules that provide a set of incentives and 
disincentives for individuals” (p. 4). Although the above definitions and descriptions of institutions are drawn 
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largely from political scientists, sociologists, and economists, there is a general consensus, the disciplinary 
differences notwithstanding, that institutions are ubiquitous in the daily lives of human beings and consist of a 
wide array of standards including routine procedures, customs, conventions, and widely accepted operating 
norms that may or may not necessarily be formally codified, but directly or indirectly serve as reference points 
for human action in a given context; and being reference points for social and political action, institutions 
provide both incentives and constraints that shape the conduct of individuals and organizations.  
As Peters (1999) observes, even though scholars differ significantly in terms of their areas of emphasis, 
there is a broad convergence on the view that human action including political “behaviours are a function of 
rules and incentives” (p. 19).  Social Scientists studying institutions are grouped into three broad categories 
consisting of historical institutionalists, sociological institutionalists, and rational choice institutionalists, 
reflecting primarily the conceptual and methodological biases of political science, sociology and economics 
respectively. While most historical institutionalists and rational choice institutionalists limit their view of 
institutions primarily to formal and informal rules, sociological institutionalist take a broader view of institutions 
to include the “taken-for-granted cultural frameworks, cognitive schema and routinized processes of 
reproduction” (Campbell, 2004, p. 11); and “symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide 
the frame of meaning guiding human action” (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947). Formal rules consist of Constitutions; 
Acts of Parliament; Constitutional, Legislative and Executive Instruments; Regulations; Bylaws; and Codes of 
Conduct among others. Informal rules on the other hand, include social norms, conventions, customs, principled 
belief, and generalized expectations.  
All the three schools of institutional theory share the view that rules are always implicitly or explicitly the 
reference points for human behaviour, and thus actors are guided by what both sociological and historical 
institutionalists described as “logic of appropriateness” and rational choice as “logic of instrumentality” 
(Campbell, 2004). So, in the political world for instance, politicians usually would scan through their 
institutional environment to ensure that their decisions and actions are in conformity with the generally accepted 
forms of behaviour and provide the maximum benefit to the society. As Peters (1999) argues, if a rule is 
effective in shaping the behaviour of actors, those actors usually will spend some time to reflect on whether their 
actions and decisions are in conformity with the values and norms of their society or organization. From an 
institutionalist point of view therefore, rules possess compelling authority and legitimacy that commit human 
beings to behave in a manner that is generally consistent with the expected behaviour embedded in them, even if 
those behaviours violate the preferences and interests of the said human beings.  
The thrust of institutionalists’ argument is that the human world is wired by rules, and those rules are 
instrumental in shaping and structuring behaviour. March & Olsen (1995) as quoted in Goodin, Jones, Simon 
(1999) argued that “political actors act and organize themselves in accordance with rules and practices that are 
socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted”…….and the  “rules and understandings frame 
thought, shape behavior and constrain interpretation” (p. 73). Irrespective of the disciplinary differences, 
institutionalists are unanimous in the view that rules provide the toolkits from which actors interpret their social, 
political and economic situations, and determine what constitutes appropriate behaviour. Rules do not only 
possess inherent values that motivate or encourage human behaviour in some directions, they also make the 
doing of some things possible and desirable, and others not. In addition, rules impose limitations on what human 
beings as social, economic and political agents can do and cannot do, and they are usually embedded with 
penalties or incentives that a person might suffer or enjoy as a consequence of behaving in a manner considered 
inconsistent or consistent with a given rule. Rules are also noted for helping to create order through the provision 
of organizing principles and definitions of what constitutes acceptable behaviour. They generate their own 
expectations and consciously and unconsciously lie at the foreground of human action.  
Consequently, what an actor considers appropriate human behaviour derives its logic of appropriateness 
from existing rules of a given context. In shaping human behaviour, rules tend to not only specify what an actor 
should do, but also what one can imagine oneself doing in a given situation. In addition, because they provide 
the cognitive scripts through which actors’ orientations and preferences are filtered, they shape not only the 
strategic calculus but also the preferences and identities of actors (Campbell, 2004). Ostrom  (1986) argues that 
rules are meant to achieve “order and predictability” by creating positions, indicating how actors enter and exit 
from those positions, specifying which actions the actors in those positions are “required, permitted, or forbidden 
to take” as well as the outcomes that the actors are permitted or prohibited to effect (p. 5). Rules therefore 
prescribe appropriate behaviour by telling actors where to look for appropriate actions, and thus facilitate 
interpretation of ambivalent situations. Understanding the institutional, that is the formal and informal rules that 
shape the behaviour of political actors in contemporary Ghanaian democratic politics is a major first step to 
appreciating the roots of the country’s politics of winner-takes-all.  
 
Rules Incentivizing Ghana’s Politics of Winner-Takes-All 
The exogenous origins of modern Ghana as an amalgam of several indigenous ethnic nations meant that the 
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crafting of a constitution to hold the Republic together pays attention to rules that promote an inclusive state 
(Anyimadu, 1997).  Ghana’s 1992 Constitution undoubtedly gave due cognizance to the importance of national 
unity by prohibiting the formation of political parties along ethnic or religious lines, and also enjoins elected 
presidents to ensure appointments to public offices take account of regional and gender balance. However, a 
number of rules that foreground the county’s democracy also provide tremendous incentives for elected 
presidents to make appointments to public officers in a manner consistent with the politics of winner-takes-all, 
without necessarily compromising the requirement of regional and gender balance imposed on such 
appointments.  
Indeed, by the very nature of competition-based democratic politics that is based on competitive partisan 
elections, it is expected that every electoral victory would bring along opportunities for the victor to make 
appointments for public office. For most political parties, once an electoral victory is secured, the task of 
executing the mandate given by the electorates requires making appointments to other public offices. Such 
appointments present an opportunity to select persons who are trusted and loyal. Modern democratic politics is 
an enterprise founded on trust, and just as the electorate in exercising their franchise demonstrate which political 
party or candidate should hold their trust, so too is trust critical for elected leaders in choosing who can assist 
them in the delivery of their vision and mandate. Unfortunately, comparative political literature is thick on trust 
as the basis of democratic politics but thin on trust as the foundation of the power of appointments vested in 
elected leaders. Beyond trust, it stands to reason that because leaders are presumably elected on the basis of a 
vision, the choice of persons for appointment to offices that participate in the execution of that vision would be 
based on their belief in the basic tenets of the vision; and demonstrated loyalty to the vision exhibited through 
participation in processes that led to its framing, articulation, and acceptance by the general public.  
No democracy can survive without the loyalty of the citizenry to democratic principles and procedures such 
as tolerance, compromise, and due process. This logic can be extended and arguably hold true for those to whom 
popular sovereignty of the people are entrusted. It may prove suicidal for an elected president to appoint persons 
whose loyalty to the vision that bore their mandate is suspect. Thus, concerns over loyalty and trustworthiness 
have compelled elected presidents in environments of competitive politics to err on the side of caution by sharing 
public office appointments among persons from their own political fraternity, thereby reducing democracy to a 
zero-sum game. This is what animates Gyampo’s (2015) description of the politics of winner-takes-all in Ghana 
as “the partisan monopolization of state resources, facilities, and opportunities, as well as the exclusion of 
political opponents from national governance” (p. 17). Although this view captures the practice as deployed, it 
ignores the fact that in winner-takes-all environments, political actors do not compete for power in order to share 
it with their opponents or with persons whose commitment and loyalty to their belief system and worldview is 
unknown. By design political parties or candidates in an election compete on the basis of differences in 
worldviews about what constitutes problems of society and the best strategies to resolve them. It is therefore 
expected that once power is won, the victor will jealously guard it, and in sharing it, appreciation and recognition 
are given to persons who share in the broader vision upon which the victory is secured. This is shaped by the fact 
that in most competitive political environments, electoral politics is treated as an art of warfare, sometimes 
complete with bloody violence.  
Consequently, electoral victory is equated to conquest as it happens in actual warfare, and state resources 
become booties of war to be shared among the members of the victorious party as rewards, and to encourage 
them to support similar efforts in the future.   Thus, although campaigns for election by political parties and their 
candidates in winners-takes-all political environments also follow appeals to the generality of the populace, after 
victory is secured, the discernible behaviours associated with winner-takes-all begin to surface. Typically, such 
behaviours include removal of perceived political opponents from office regardless of merit and competence, 
sharing political offices for and among party loyalists, appointment of unqualified party supporters to public 
office as rewards for support, and treatment of state resources as war booties to be shared among party 
apparatchiks. Even though the practice is against the objective of nation-building and political inclusion due to 
its sometimes wasteful, discriminatory, divisive, and exclusionary nature, it persists. This is because such actions 
derive their logic of appropriateness from the institutional rules that underpin the competitive elections from 
which governments are produced. While such behaviours may be seen as infractions on commonsense, they 
remain unconstrained by widely shared norms and expectations. 
In addition, it is generally accepted that individuals and groups directly or indirectly contribute to the 
election of a party or candidate to form a government because of a shared ideological worldview, but more 
important because they expect their efforts to be appropriately rewarded. For candidates and political parties, 
such rewards when granted, are demonstrations of trust and believability, and become political currency to 
purchase loyal and support towards the next election. Thus, in winner-takes-all politics, candidates of a political 
party who chooses to dabble in “father for all” or “mother for all” politics by appointing to public office persons 
unknown to their political party after victory is secured, risks losing the support of the rank and file of their party, 
irrespective of whether such appointments were made on the basis of competence or merit. This is so, because, it 
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is in the nature of winner-takes-all politics not to share the “spoils” with anyone other than the victors.  It must 
however be understood that democracy is an idea, an ideal, the practice of which requires wise institutional 
engineering, in part through the design and deployment of rules that weaken and constrain the human tendency 
to use political power primarily for selfish ends, including the temptation to engage in spoils-sharing in the form 
of allocating state resources for the purposes of winning and sustaining political loyalty. The ability of a 
democracy to promote inclusiveness or conversely divide a people along class, ethnic, racial, religious or other 
lines is partly a function of the rules that lie at the foundation of its establishment. This underscores the 
importance of rules in shaping the behaviour of political actors.  
It therefore goes without saying that there are taken-for-granted informal rules inherent in the institutional 
design of Ghana’s democracy that encourage the behaviour of winner takes-all on the part of elected officials. 
For instance, the very choice of competition as the mechanism through which political leaders are chosen has the 
tendency to produce an environment in which winners in a political competition will treat their victory as an 
opportunity for spoils sharing. Political competition theorists argue that electoral competition creates an 
incentive for incumbent leaders to govern well given that the electorate generally punish nonperformance with 
rejection. This principle in turn creates incentives for organized political opposition to present alternative 
policies and programs to the public with the view of being rewarded with the trust of the people in an electoral 
competition. According to this school of thought, the process helps to ensure accountability, also improves the 
substantive quality of government output, and promotes healthy political discourse especially because organized 
political parties seek to outshine one another in the market place of policy ideas (Downs, 1957). 
However, the experience in Ghana and in other democracies suggest that political competition can be very 
divisive and descend into an exercise of slandering political opponents.  Ghana’s competitive political 
environment is akin to war among various groups. Campaigns are waged and pursued as though the parties are at 
war with each other. In such a political environment, politics is treated like war, and political opponents are not 
seen as collaborators in the struggle to provide public goods, but as adversaries or enemies that must be 
vanquished, crushed and eliminated. It is this poisoned environment of electoral competition that emboldens 
elected leaders to distribute resources associated with public office in a manner akin to spoilt-sharing after war. 
The unspoken view of competitive elections in Ghana as war by other means, means that sharing of the spoils 
after the elections are over derives its logic of appropriateness from the very divisive and “we versus them” 
nature of the country’s system of competitive electoral competition.  
Pushing the war analogy further, there is a generally accepted mechanism where elections are fueled by real 
and immediate rewards or promises of rewards in the future. The artillery for the electoral war is, therefore, cash, 
now or later, and actual electioneering campaigns are designed in a monied fashion. A convoy of fuel guzzling 
four-wheel drive cars carry candidates and their loyalists and trekking from one end of the country to the other, 
dishing out cash and gifts while promising everything from skyscrapers to pit latrines. Aping the older 
democracies, media advertisements are taken out for cash or on credit, and various organisations spring up and 
undertake thousands of events and initiatives in support of the candidate, usually ending with food and 
refreshments that cost lots of money. Many rural dwellers, illegitimately starved of central government and city 
resources, wait patiently every four years for this day to dawn, so that they may exploit the candidate and her 
loyalties and stock enough resources for the ensuing four years. Candidates for political office pre-finance all 
these activities with loans and donations from where-ever they can find them. Heavily indebted after victory, the 
rationale course of action is to pay off debts and reward loyalty through the spoils of electoral victory.  
Third, the lack of direct state funding of political parties has incentivized the use of appointments to 
political office as reward for those whose financial and other contributions produce the victory in elections. 
Since 1992, all elected presidents ran and won their elections on the ticket of political parties, and the largest 
majority of Members of Parliament have also earned their place in the legislature through their political parties. 
Given the importance of political parties in our democracy, it is puzzling that the state does not provide public 
funding for political parties. Political parties today are not only instruments for interest aggregation and 
articulation, they are also the only organizations that provide form and meaning to elections in our democracy. 
However, the closest the 1992 Constitution comes to matters of funding of political parties is the provision in 
Article 55 (15), which states that “only a citizen of Ghana can make contribution or donation to a political party 
registered in Ghana.” This provision was given some flesh by the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574) which 
limits funding of political parties in Ghana to donations and financial contributions from Ghanaians and entities 
of Ghanaian ownership.  
Arguably, the intention of the framers of the 1992 Constitution from which the Political Parties Act derived 
its strength is to ensure that the citizens through their voluntary contributions and active membership will own 
and control the activities of political parties including their programs and choice of candidates. What is lost on 
the framers is that in environments of radical poverty, where only very few have disposable income and where 
workers live from pay cheque to pay cheque, and a large majority of non-salaried workers have no sustainable 
means of livelihood, the noble idea of voluntary financial contribution to political parties is a distant dream. The 
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absence of direct state funding of political parties has, therefore, created a situation where elected leaders use 
positions of public office or public resources to reward or show appreciation to individuals whose financial 
support contribute to their electoral victory. Unsurprisingly, persons who make financial and other contributions 
to the election efforts of parties and candidates perceive their efforts as investments, expecting to be rewarded 
generously once victory is achieved and the candidate so supported assumes political office. Thus, the lack of 
state funding of political activities has created incentives for elected leaders to treat the mandate obtained 
through competitive elections as spoils of war to be shared among the troops they commanded in the battlefield. 
In such situations, elected leaders are tempted to distribute public office appointments to friends, family, party 
supporters, and close acquaintances not necessarily on merit but mostly on the grounds of their past loyalty and 
support as well as expected future loyalty and support. 
Fourth, the provisions in the Constitution that grant elected presidents the opportunity to contest for re-
election for a second four-year term incentivizes incumbent leaders to act in a manner that rewards party 
members and supporters as a way of encouraging them to work toward a re-election bid. Although the idea of re-
election is a mechanism intended to induce accountability and responsiveness of governments (Carey, 2013), it 
has also been instrumental in fostering an environment of perpetual partisanship, as the ruling party and the 
opposition parties persistently struggle to undo each other in the public space. Advocates of presidential re-
election contend that “the possibility of re-election increases a politician’s responsiveness to citizen demands and 
allows voters the freedom to retain popular incumbents” (Carey, 2013, p. 119). In addition, re-election is 
perceived as a measure that can compel incumbent presidents to act in a responsible and accountable manner by 
aligning their policies and programs to the needs, expectations and aspirations of voters. This is based on the 
belief that voters will “reward politicians who promise and deliver popular policies, such that such presidents 
who aspire to re-election will be more attentive to citizens’ preferences than those who are constitutional lame 
ducks” (Carey, 2013, p. 126). Undoubtedly, the thinking behind re-election ensures that voters have the 
opportunity to assess the quality of leadership offered by an elected president and reward or punish them 
depending on the outcome of their assessments. To that extent, therefore, presidents are constantly reminded on 
the verdict that awaits them in re-elections. Even though fundamentally re-election was espoused on the believe 
that it will induce high performance by incumbents, it has, for presidents serving their first term, made elections 
always loom large in their scheme of things, more as a threat than as a source of empowerment or 
encouragement.   
In relation to the above, the experience in Ghana since 1993 suggests that presidents serving their first term 
have always had to perceive and deal with the next election as a danger, and the entirety of governance processes 
is filtered through what can deliver the next election. But pondering about the next election goes beyond mere 
performance, especially in contexts where political opponents in the spirit of campaigns make every effort to 
discredit even the most notable achievements. Taken together, the situation compels the elected presidents in 
Ghana not only to begin thinking about the next election by way of their re-election and to safeguard their 
chances, but to take the logical step to share public offices and resources to individuals who contributed to their 
electoral victory in the first instance; or to those who belong to their parties as a reward for previous support, and 
as a form of insurance premium for expected support in the next election. Thus, the insertion of re-election as an 
accountability measure in Ghana’s electoral system, is an institutional rule that weakens the incentives for 
appointments based on meritocracy, and instead enhances the opportunity structures for leaders to act in a 
manner that reflects winner-takes-all.  
Finally, the President’s wide powers of appointment as provided for in the 1992 Constitution and the 
Presidential Transition Act have together created a fertile ground for the politics of winner-takes-all. The 
practice during transfers of power since 2000 has been that the outgoing president retires with almost all the 
appointees who worked during the term of that president in various capacities. This convention was given formal 
legal backing in 2012 with the passage of the Presidential Transition Act which states in section 14 that 
“(1) On the assumption of office of the person elected as President, a person holding any of the 
offices specified in the Schedule shall cease to hold that office, and shall be paid the relevant 
retirement benefits and the enjoyment of facilities as provided by law.  
(2) The functions of office of a person who ceases to hold office under subsection (1) shall be 
performed by a person so appointed by the President for the period specified in writing by the 
President.” 
The Schedule in reference states that the following office holders cease to be occupiers of their respective 
offices upon the assumption of power by a newly elected president. They include (a) Ministers and Deputy 
Ministers of State, (b) Regional and Deputy Regional Ministers of State, (c) Special Assistants, Special Aides to 
the President, to the Vice-President and to the Ministers of State, Deputy Ministers, Regional Ministers and 
Deputy Regional Ministers, (d) Non-career Ambassadors and High Commissioners, and (e) Persons appointed 
by the President or a Minister of State as members of Statutory Boards and Corporations. In effect, these 
provisions made it mandatory for all these persons appointed  by an outgoing president to vacate their offices 
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and make way for the incoming president and his team. With various public offices rendered vacant once a new 
president assumes office, the door is opened for a new president to make appointments to positions as deemed 
necessary for the performance of the duties assigned the office.  
The presidential power of appointment derives its logic of appropriateness from several provisions in the 
1992 Constitution, and has been a recipe for the politics of winner-takes-all. For instance, Article 70 (1) (a-e); 
Article 74 (1); Article 86 (2) (i); Article 183(4) (a); Article 185(3); Article 189 (1) (a); Article 70 (2); Article 232 
(2); Article 78(1); Article 79 (1); Article 144 (1-5); Article 86(2) (vi); Article 89 (2) (a) (i-iii); Article 89 (2) (d); 
Article 153 (n); and Article 166(1)(c) all grant a president various degrees of powers to appointment persons to 
positions ranging from Ministers and Deputy Ministers of State, some members of the Council of State, non-
career ambassadors, members of the National Development Planning Commission, Governor of the Central 
Bank, Administrator of the District Assembly Common Fund, and the members of the Public Services 
Commission. In addition, the president has the power to appoint a Chief Justice, an Auditor-General, and 
Commissioners of the Electoral Commission, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice and 
the National Commission on Civic Education when such positions are vacant. Furthermore, an elected president 
is also clothed with powers to nominate others, including District, Municipal and Metropolitan Chief Executives 
for approval by the assemblies, and appoint members of hundreds of statutory boards under the ministries, 
departments and agencies across the country. It therefore stands to reason that the provisions in the constitution 
and other legislation requiring an outgoing president to exit together with his or her appointees, while granting 
an incoming president extensive powers of appointment, are in themselves  constitutional and lawful foundations 
for what has now become the politics of winner-takes-all in Ghana.  
 
Conclusion  
For multi-ethnic post-colonial states in Africa that take the attainment of independence also as the birth of a new 
social contract, the primary objective of the polity is to (a) build a new sense of nationhood, (c) promote socio-
economic development, and (c) establish democratic systems of governance. The challenges presented by 
institutional design for governance processes and nation-building in Ghana raises questions about the overall 
sync between rules of governance and the quest for building an inclusive nation-state. Prior to colonial rule, 
Ghana like most African countries adopted democratic institutions in different variations that prioritize 
consensus-building, collaboration, and cooperation among different factions and groups in society. The ruthless 
manner in which colonial rule superimpose western institutions of governance on preexisting rules has resulted 
in a bifurcation of the public space. With this context in mind, the design of democratic institutions in Ghana 
ought to have taken into account the primacy of rules that have the tendency to pull the people together, rather 
than those that push them apart. The preference for a partisan competitive mode of electing national leaders in 
the manner in which it was design has largely been responsible for the challenge of winner-takes-all, which is 
arguably the number one bane of Ghana’s democratic experiment. This is because the practice  ties in well with 
other nefarious practices such as monied democracy, the militarization of political parties, political vigilantism, 
ethnicity, opportunity hoarding, and many other related practices.  
Although the political parties and civil society organizations have expressed worry about the exclusionary 
character of winner-takes-all politics in Ghana it remains the behaviour of choice for political parties when they 
are elected to office. In this paper, we have argued that winner-takes-all is an effect and not a cause of the 
country’s governance challenges. This is because, it is the institutional design of our democratic experiment, 
which is a function of our rules of governance, that accounts for the winner-takes-all phenomenon. In this way, 
we draw attention to the centrality of formal and informal rules and their design in shaping political behaviour.  
By examining various provisions of Ghana’s Constitution and key Acts of Parliament that regulate 
competition for political office, we isolate the following as the culprits that engender the winner-takes-all 
phenomenon. First are the rules that institute competitive electoral politics; then the rules that allow money 
electioneering; third are the rules that sustain the absence of public funding of political parties; the fourth are the 
set of rules that allow a president to stand for re-election; and finally the rules that vest in the President huge and 
wide powers of appointment to public offices. To avert sliding into civil conflicts on accounts of competitive 
elections, and instead consolidate and sustain the country’s democracy, it is imperative that the rules of 
governance are reordered in a manner that promotes nation-building, real good governance, and economic 
opportunities for all.  
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